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BEN FINE
Economics and Interdisciplinarity:  
One Step Forward, N Steps Back?*
Mainstream economics has become more interdisciplinary. Why is this? Does it repre‑
sent a break with its intra ‑disciplinary character? How does it relate to major points of 
criticism – the lack of realism and disregard for methodology and alternative schools 
and history of economic thought? What light does this shed on the nature of economics 
today? Answers are found by tracing “economics imperialism” through three phases, 
emphasising the “historical logic” of economics imperialism, how its initial confinement 
to market supply and demand created a logical framing of universal application. As a 
result, microeconomics (and econometrics) triumphed over other fields and methods 
to such an extent and with such an acceptability that its corresponding principles are 
now applied, however inconsistently, with those of other disciplines and fields through 
a process termed “suspension”. 
Keywords: economic alternatives; epistemological decolonization, interdisciplinarity; 
mainstream economics; political economy.
Economics Is as Economics Does
The purpose of this piece is to assess the prospects for political economy, 
especially in the context of interdisciplinarity. A necessary starting point 
for making such an assessment is the current state of mainstream eco-
nomics. I approach this obliquely in the first instance, and anecdotally. 
I was recently invited to give a lecture at the Institute of German Historical 
Research in London as part of a series to mark the 200th anniversary 
of Karl Marx’s birth, May 5th, 1818, and I sought to address the theme 
of Marx’s continuing influence on contemporary social science. Other 
talks in the series included politics, sociology, anthropology and history. 
I explained that the one on economics would necessarily be extremely 
* Based on a plenary address to the founding conference of the Portuguese Association of Political 
Economy, held at Lisbon, ISCTE -IUL, 25 -27 January 2018. Thanks to journal editors and referees 
for most helpful comments and suggestions.
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short as Marx had predominantly been excluded from mainstream eco-
nomics today, since the mainstream totally dominates the discipline with 
little room for, let alone tolerance of, alternatives. This is so whether 
deriving from Marx, other classical authors, or political economy or 
otherwise more widely. As a result, I offered to give a lecture explaining 
why this was so, whether this was or was not a sign of health of the dis-
mal science, and what sets economics apart as a social science in being 
so negligent of Marx (and others), themes to which I will return below.
First, though, let me recall an earlier lecture I gave a few years ago for 
the Association of Social Economies, in which I suggested that the main-
stream is unfit for purpose, focusing on just one of the many dimensions 
for which this is so, that is, its own heavy ethical content which it seeks 
to deny as being present in view of its putative scientific/positive content 
as opposed to normative content (Fine, 2013). In preparing the lecture, 
I undertook a simple test of the self -confidence of the discipline, compar-
ing it with sociology. In the wake of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), I searched the scholarly literature employing the terms “crisis 
of sociology” and “crisis of economics”. Sociology had a steady stream 
(if not a torrent) of contributions, numbering in the thousands, persisting 
over time and suggesting a commendable degree of self -critical examina-
tion. Economics, by contrast, barely totalled 100, most of these dating 
to a debate from the 1930s on Schumpeter. Especially in the wake of the 
GFC, one has to wonder whether this lack of critical self -examination is 
a mark of the mainstream’s success or of its failure.1
This is indicative of one of a number of other features of the mainstream: 
1) its absolute self -confidence; 2) its lack or misuse (if not abuse) of the 
history of economic thought; 3) its lack of engagement with alternatives; 
4) its poverty of methodology; 5) its lack of realism; and 6) denial of, and so lack 
of attention to, normative content and issues.2 As a result, the absence of 
Marx from the mainstream is not a targeted exception, as much as the same 
is true of all major figures in the history of economic thought, and, other than 
opportunistically, most major figures in social science as well. Does this mean 
that there is no interdisciplinarity with respect to and within mainstream 
economics? I would suggest not at all, hardly surprising as I have been 
critically peddling the notion of economics imperialism, the colonisation of 
the subject matter of other social sciences by economics for twenty years or 
more now. Let me explore this in detail in order both to specify the nature 
1 For an account of the “superiority” (if not the arrogance) of economists, see Fourcade et al. (2015).
2 Discussed at length in Fine (2013).
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of contemporary mainstream economics, its approach to interdisciplinarity, 
and the potential for alternatives.3
Economics Imperialism
The term economic(s) imperialism dates from the 1930s, but it only really 
gathers momentum after the Second World War (WWII). From there, it has 
gone through three phases, ones which I have called the “old”, the “new” 
and the “newer”. The first phase reflects the Post WWII period, the second 
corresponds in part to a reaction to the monetarist counter -revolution built 
upon the first phase (although this second phase had a dynamic and logic 
of its own), with the current phase just about preceding but intensified 
by the GFC.
Analytically speaking, the logical origins of economics imperialism lie in 
what I have termed as its historical logic, which will require a bit of a nar-
rative in the history of economic thought to specify. With the Marginalist 
Revolution of the 1870s, especially through Marshall rather than Jevons, 
Menger and Walras,4 we receive the key concepts of what I call the Technical 
Apparatus, TA1, which has remained persistent within mainstream econom-
ics to the present day. It is the apparatus attached to utility and production 
functions and their application to supply and demand through the market. 
In what was to be termed microeconomics from the 1930s, and as the junior 
partner to macroeconomics that distinguished itself and became the senior 
branch given the pressing problems of unemployment, TA1 set itself two 
major problems. The first refers to the properties of supply and demand 
functions, given that they derive from optimising individuals, and the second 
addresses what I call the Technical Architecture, denoted by TA2, which 
gave rise to the problem of forming the aggregate economy out of those 
individuals coordinated through the market, otherwise known as general 
equilibrium, and whether it exists and is unique, stable and Pareto efficient. 
Forging these two problems, and TA1 and TA2 together and we get what 
might be designated as TA2.
The first of these problems was solved in the late 1930s and the second in 
the 1950s, via what are known, respectively, as the Hicks -Slutsky -Samuelson 
3 The main thrust of what follows is to be found in Milonakis and Fine (2009) and Fine and 
Milonakis (2009) but for some more recent material and reflections around other themes, see 
my other later contributions (Fine, 2010, 2011, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017a, 2017b and 2018; 
Fine and Dimakou, 2016; Fine and Milonakis, 2011), where extensive references to, and discus- 
sion of, the broader literature can be found.
4 Marshall’s Principles was the main microeconomic textbook until the end of the 1930s, laying 
out and applying the technical apparatus. General equilibrium, despite preoccupying Walras, 
only drew concerted attention from the mid -1930s (Marshall, 1959 [1890]).
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conditions and by Arrow and Debreu for General Equilibrium. I am less 
concerned with the solutions than with the process and context by and within 
which they occurred. I call the process an implosion – for it involved making 
whatever assumptions are necessary to be able to derive meaningful results, 
assumptions such as fixed individuals, preferences, endowments, technolo-
gies, single motivation, fixed goods, etc., even technical assumptions within its 
own frame such as no externalities, increasing returns, concavities and imper-
fect competition. These are the origins of the mainstream’s deviation from 
whatever we mean by realism since, whatever the extent of use of empirical 
information in econometrics or otherwise, it is theoretically embedded in 
assumptions that suit the theory rather than the evidence.5 Theoretically, 
we do whatever is necessary to get what we want. Indeed, this actually sets 
a standard method within the discipline: make whatever assumptions (and 
exclusions) we need for our purposes and reality will have to fit, giving rise to 
all sorts of problems, even on its own terms, as a result of what are known as 
aggregation problems, the theory of the second best, the Cambridge critique 
of capital theory, and so on. This is indicative of a myth that the mainstream 
purveys of itself, that it is first and foremost committed to mathematical 
rigour. This may be so in obtaining mathematical results themselves if by 
virtue of mathematical reasoning alone. But such rigour derived from the 
mathematics is far from being carried over when observing the implications 
of mathematical reasoning, which asserts that most standard assumptions 
and results are implausible (as with existence, uniqueness, efficiency and 
stability of general equilibrium, for example).
So much for the process by which these results were derived with corre-
sponding implications for the content of economic theory that was to become 
standardised, natural to economists if totally unnatural in relation to realism. 
The context in the interwar period within which such TA2 microeconom-
ics emerged and began to flourish was one in which it did so alongside the 
increasingly prominent and more significant macroeconomics and what 
we now call the old or, more recently, the original institutional economics, 
both to distinguish it from the new and to indicate that it remains relevant, 
respectively. The latter had, and increasingly, covered a wide range of what 
became more generally dubbed as applied economics, reflecting inductive, 
practical fields with mixed methods suitable to the subject matter at hand 
(public economics, labour economics, business cycles, technical change, 
and so on). This was very strong at the time in the United States and, 
5 Made explicit by Friedman (1953) in dismissing the need for realism in assumptions, although 
the so -called F -twist rejected as such by Samuelson (1963).
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alongside economic history, comprised core components of teaching and 
research, concerning itself with unavoidably contemporary developments 
for those who cared to see them, not least with the rise of large corpora-
tions, labour movements, technical change, consumerism and short - and 
long -term business cycles. These traditions survived into the post -war 
period but were subject to erosion and even marginalisation as such, if not 
immediately and only gradually. 
When I began studying economics in the late 1960s, such subjects were 
still a core part of the curriculum but had already begun to be subject to 
accelerating capture in light of, and as raw material for, the internal colo-
nisation of the discipline by microeconomics and its more limited methods 
(see below). Further, the so -called formalist revolution of the 1950s, which 
began the heavy mathematisation of the discipline,6 adopting the methods 
of the newly -established microeconomics, heavily consolidated the division 
between economics and the other social sciences (with its wider range of 
methods and conceptualisations including that of the economy). 
So, with the two basic microeconomic problems set and solved on their 
own terms, microeconomics and its core TA2 were established at the heart 
of at least one major field within the discipline. I can now specify the his-
torical logic of economics imperialism, for, historically, TA2 was derived out 
of addressing the problem of the consequences for supply and demand in 
the context of an entirely idealised and isolated market system. What are the 
(formally -derived) implications for supply and demand curves arising out of 
one part of individual economic behaviour in the context of a disembedded 
market? But, remarkably, and logically, the core concepts that were deployed 
(self -interest, inputs and outputs, efficiency, equilibrium and optimisation) 
depended purely upon universal, general, asocial, ahistorical (use whatever 
terms you wish) concepts with no relation to the market as such – specifically 
utility and production functions and the mathematical formulations associ-
ated with them. Hence, this gave rise to a tension of historical confinement 
to the market at one extreme, reflecting the origins of TA2 and a logic of 
universal, not market -confined conceptualisations and potential application, 
at the other.7 As a result, there was potential to move in the direction of 
greater scope of application of TA2, to apply supply and demand as it were 
beyond the market, according to whatever took the economists’ fancy and 
to whatever extent it would be accepted by fellow economists or even those 
6 For discussion of the mathematization of economics, see Milonakis (2017).
7 This is made clear by Robbins (1935 [1932]) defining economics ahistorically and asocially as 
the allocation of scarce resources to competing ends.
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from other disciplines. Against the historical origins of TA2, the logic pushed 
towards using its methods and tools to expand its application. The implo-
sion to establish the TA2, and its subsequent implications, was to be thrown 
into reverse, slowly and surely at first but, as will be seen, in an increasingly 
explosive manner, as it gathered momentum. 
This, then, gave rise to the first phase of economics imperialism, a reflec-
tion of this historical logic, with the most notable exponent being Gary 
Becker. What characterises this first phase, the old economics imperialism, is 
that it seeks to apply TA2 not only to its initiating problem of the implications 
of individual optimising behaviour in a market context (supply and demand) 
but across other economic and social problems, in principle without limit. 
It comes to treat the non -market, the social, as if a market were present, 
as if family members trade with one another, for example, or criminal activ-
ity is simply a matter of potential rewards set against potential punishment 
at the margin. Initially, the most prominent applications were to be found 
with human capital theory (treat skills and learning and their application 
as if a fixed asset), the new economic history (or cliometrics, which treats 
the past as if models of supply and demand) and public choice theory 
(politics as markets). But in the context of the post -war boom and the intel-
lectual triumph of Keynesianism, microeconomics remained subservient to 
macroeconomics (in the form of IS/LM), and there remained some continu-
ing strength of applied economics, as well as respect for, possibly intellectual 
intimidation by, disciplinary boundaries.
But the stagflation of the 1970s gave rise to the monetarist counterrevo-
lution most closely associated with Milton Friedman. Yet, ultimately, and 
equally and intellectually much more important or wide -ranging, something 
else was gathering momentum, possibly less likely to be recognised because of 
the dramatic demise of the previously hegemonic Keynesianism both as a field 
of macroeconomic scholarship and as a rationale for much more wide -ranging 
interventionism. For, generally, the monetarist counter -revolution also sig-
nalled a watershed for the reversal of the macroeconomic/microeconomic 
hierarchy within the discipline. In turn, it was associated with two effects 
of importance for our narrative. First, the applied fields became subject to 
“theory”, i.e. microeconomics, and became squeezed out as alternatives, 
most notably in the appropriately dubbed new development economics 
and the Washington Consensus, examples of the first phase of economics 
imperialism (treat everything as if, and to be made into, perfectly work-
ing markets) par excellence. This signified the extent to which economics 
imperialism was internally colonising the discipline of economics, not least 
macroeconomics itself, with its reduction to microeconomics. With the 
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New Classical Economics (NCE), and the emergence of rational expecta-
tions, representative individuals, and so on, macroeconomics was increas-
ingly driven to the extremes of microeconomics, and assumptions to suit 
the theory rather than the subject matter. 
Second, and subsequently, there came the restoration of (hydraulic) 
Keynesianism8 through asymmetric information, market imperfection 
economics, consolidating (rather than breaking with) the reliance upon 
microeconomics, and many of the extreme assumptions attached to the 
NCE, such as rational expectations, representative individuals, and reduc-
tion of finance to the supply of and demand for money. In time, the New 
Consensus Macroeconomics emerged, and rose to hegemony until it was 
rudely shattered by the GFC, exposing even for its exponents how impover-
ished macroeconomics had become in content and scope.9 With real business 
cycles, and technical change treated as random shocks, the NCE was macro 
treated as micro, and not only taken to extremes but also in extreme ways. 
Lucas (2003) famously declares that micro has the prospect of making macro 
superfluous, possibly by defining as economics only what can be done by 
microeconomics.10 
Inevitably, there were (orthodox) Keynesian reactions against such 
extremes, although they are striking for incorporating rather than rejecting 
much of the initiatives attached to NCE (especially in terms of continuing 
reliance upon microeconomics and rational expectations if not perfectly 
working markets and completely ineffective state intervention).11 Such were 
8 By which we mean, here and elsewhere, the hegemonic IS/LM framework of the Keynesian period, 
as opposed to the many varieties of Keynesianism that have both co -existed with and succeeded it.
9 For Blanchard (2008: 1; italics added), erstwhile Chief Economist at the International Monetary 
Fund: “For a long while after the explosion of macroeconomics in the 1970s, the field looked like a 
battlefield. Over time however, largely because facts do not go away, a largely shared vision both of 
fluctuations and of methodology has emerged. Not everything is fine. Like all revolutions, this one 
has come with the destruction of some knowledge, and suffers from extremism and herding. None of 
this deadly however (sic). The state of macro is good”. Subsequently, five mea culpas were confessed 
in explaining how the state of macro was no longer good, that: low inflation should be a primary 
target of policy; this could be achieved through the single instrument of the interest rate; fiscal policy 
was of limited significance; financial regulation was not a macroeconomic matter; and, with the 
Great Moderation, continued stability was more or less guaranteed (Blanchard et al., 2010).
10 Thus, as opposed to stochastic risk, “in cases of uncertainty economic reasoning will be of no 
value” (Lucas 1981: 224).
11 Thus, for the neoclassical Keynesian, Solow, extreme distaste for the NCE is expressed and widely 
cited as follows: “Suppose someone sits down where you are sitting right now and announces to me 
that he is Napoleon Bonaparte. The last thing I want to do with him is to get involved in a technical 
discussion on cavalry tactics at the Battle of Austerlitz. If I do that, I’m getting tacitly drawn into 
the game that he is Napoleon Bonaparte” (Solow in Klamer, 1984: 146). But his own promotion 
of the economy as a single production function, and treatment of technical change as a residual in 
the 1950s is no less extreme and, indeed, facilitated further the macro as micro extremes of what 
was to follow, however much unpalatable to him as a Keynesian.
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the market imperfection foundations for what was to give rise to the second 
phase, the new, economics imperialism. Unlike the old economics imperial-
ism, which treated the non -market as if market (the choice between apples 
and pears is exactly the same as between war and peace, for public choice 
Nobel prize -winner James Buchanan), the new economics imperialism treats 
non -market as if it were a response to market imperfections. So, for example, 
the family, the state, institutions, customs and culture are all to be explained 
as the response to the failure of the market to work perfectly. As a result, 
non -market relations emerge, if still on the basis of optimising behaviour. 
These have the potential either to improve equilibrium outcomes or even to 
worsen them (as would be argued by those who believe in market perfections 
where interventions to improve upon the market merely make it work worse).
This held out the prospect of a more widespread and palatable econom-
ics imperialism from the perspective of other social sciences, in light of not 
reducing everything to be market -like, thereby giving rise to a whole range 
of “new” or renewed fields for the mainstream – such as the new economic 
sociology, the new welfare economics, the new institutional economics, 
the revitalisation of the new economic history (led by Douglas North with the 
startling claim that institutions matter), the new growth theory, and the shift 
from new to “newer” development economics (and from Washington to 
post-Washington Consensus).12 This is all reflected in what can be termed 
a “bringing back in”, or BBI syndrome. This is paradoxical, even perverse, 
since given that the TA2 could only be established by omitting legions of 
considerations in order to be able to establish core results, that apparatus 
was now to be more broadly applied, precisely in order to address those 
considerations upon which its legitimacy depended on them being absented.
As is well -known, the emblematic example of the new market imperfec-
tions economics is Akerlof’s market for second -hand cars considered to 
be lemons. Asymmetric information between buyers and sellers means the 
market is inefficient. Those wishing to get together to exchange a superior 
(inferior) car at higher (lower) price cannot do so since such cars are indistin-
guishable from one another and so must sell at the same price. Higher quality 
cars may be excluded from the market at too low a price, and lower quality 
cars crowd in at price higher than value. This is inefficient as such but it is 
also possible that there will be excess supply (demand) if prices settle high 
(low) or absence of markets altogether if no one trusts quality sufficiently. 
But this has nothing to do with second -hand cars in particular. The same 
12 Also space was found for game theory and its application to behavioural economics (strategising 
to optimise rather than allowing for other behavioural motivations in the first instance). 
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could happen in any market. Concerned dealers might group together and 
offer a warranty scheme, a non -market, collective solution. By the same 
token, this is the embryonic form of the state, culture, habit, institutions, etc. 
Microeconomic market imperfections are enabled to explain the non -market 
as responses to those imperfections. 
So, microeconomics and market imperfections allow more or less any 
economic and social variable to be incorporated on the basis of optimising 
individuals. This potential inclusion of variables as a response to market 
imperfection holds the key to the current, newer phase of economics imperial-
ism, emerging prior to but accelerated by the GFC. This phase is character-
ised, relative to the market imperfections phase, by what I call “suspension”. 
The BBI could only become increasingly significant once TA2 was so strongly 
and unquestioningly deployed that it could be done so without being threat-
ened by confrontation, combination even, with inconsistent assumptions or 
conceptualisations around what has been left out. Most notable, for example, 
is bounded rationality, and behavioural economics more generally, and game 
theory (treated with suspicion as TA2 was being consolidated because of its 
behavioural interdependencies). But the BBI associated with the new phase 
of economics imperialism is akin to an original sin, motivating the inclusion 
of any variable as subject to optimisation. But, by the same token, once these 
variables have been introduced on this basis, it is a simple step to continue to 
use them on whatever basis is chosen without necessarily relying completely 
and exclusively on optimising behaviour alone. 
As a result, the exclusive preoccupation with optimisation can be sus-
pended, but it is not discarded. It might be combined with other motivations 
and constraints other than the market. Even where optimisation (especially 
as utility maximisation) is abandoned altogether, there is a tendency for it 
to remain present in the form of what individuals would do if they or the 
world in which they live were perfect. Such suspension enriches the scale 
and scope of BBI, allowing for mixed theories in the formulation of the 
loosest of models – throw in variables and estimate, dovetailing with increasing 
presence of econometrics which allows a corresponding shift in meaning 
of model from theory to an equation or six. The world becomes a Cobb-
-Douglas function, or CES (constant elasticity of substitution) if you can 
manage it, most notably in empirical applications of the new, endogenous 
growth theory. And, with suspension, the mainstream economist can claim 
no longer to be neoclassical, to have become more realistic, and even to be 
interdisciplinary and heterodox in departing from what has gone before 
– although the reality is that the methods, theories and conceptualisations of 
the latest phase of economics imperialism remain negligent of, and hostile to, 
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those of other disciplines and heterodoxy especially regarding the analysis 
of the systemic, power, conflict, class and so on that take suspension too far 
from core dependence upon TA2.13
Acknowledging the Strengths, Exposing and Exploiting the Weaknesses
In short, economics and economics imperialism in its latest phase of suspen-
sion is so powerful and confident in its core, TA2, that it is able to breach it at 
will in extending itself to ever more areas of application. In a sense, it is fake 
news within the realm of academia. It also projects itself from an extraordi-
narily powerful position of institutional, Americanised strength, over training 
of PhDs, control of journals, command of Nobel Prizes, and so on.
But, equally, matching the overwhelming and even increasing institutional 
hold of the mainstream over the discipline, there are striking and increasingly 
overt intellectual weaknesses. The first and most stunningly obvious one is 
incapacity relative to the GFC: the inability to explain, even after the event, 
how it could have happened. Second is the lack of a coherent world vision 
– whether Ricardian, Keynesian or even monetarist – which commands gen-
eral support despite the unanimity on unquestioned methods, centred on, 
even if suspended from, TA2. Third is the inability of economics to explain 
the economy, the need to draw upon other social sciences and variables to 
do so, an implicit acceptance that economics as such is unfit for the economy 
without supplementation from the non -economic and the other social sci-
ences. Fourth, once the mainstream trespasses onto other disciplines, outside 
its extreme methods, conceptualisations and assumptions, it exposes itself 
to critical alternatives drawn from the other social sciences. Fifth, the sys-
temic and interpretative aspects of the other social sciences and the humani-
ties are the least amenable to economics imperialism although weak assaults 
are and can be made; mainstream economics is extremely uncomfortable 
with the non -individualistic or what can be derived from it, not least with 
respect to issues of power and conflict, and equally ill at ease with the criti-
cal examination of the meaning and reconstruction of concepts and their 
normative content.
The most recent and obvious example of most of these weaknesses is 
provided by the concept of financialisation. This has exploded across the 
social sciences over the last decade but it has as yet had no presence at all 
13 There are also claims not only of understanding the world as deriving from markets, working 
perfectly or otherwise, but also of capacity to create better -performing markets through appropriate 
design and regulation of markets and behaviour. Here, there are affinities with the performativity 
thesis (for example, the role of Black -Scholes in creating financial markets) but see Fine (2016d) 
for a critique.
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within the mainstream,14 with the presumption that all that has happened in 
the intervening period can be sufficiently addressed through the suspensions 
previously suggested, broader behavioural assumptions in particular to the 
fore. But, whilst understandably prominent as a deficiency of the mainstream, 
brought to light by the GFC, this is merely the tip of the iceberg of a legion 
of deficiencies driven even by a suspended methodological individualism: 
how we deal with innovation, distribution, monopolisation, globalisation, 
neoliberalisation, the exercise of power, conflicts, their meanings, contex-
tualisation and determinants.
This allows for a more positive turn in our account, especially where 
interdisciplinarity is concerned and through which mainstream economics 
is exposed by the mainstream let alone radical social science. For it is pre-
cisely with its narrow and reduced conceptualisation of the economy that 
mainstream economics’ weaknesses have their other worldly mirror images 
in other social sciences. Nor is this merely a matter of logic and differences 
in interdisciplinary boundaries and inner content. Following a period of 
postmodernism, without ever fully discarding its fecund successors (varieties 
of post - this and that  -isms) over the past twenty years, the social sciences 
have taken a more material or realist turn, as reflected in the treatments of 
neoliberalism and globalisation and, as already mentioned, financialisation. 
Attention has turned to how these developments with respect to neoliberal-
ism, globalisation and, increasingly, financialisation, have affected everything 
from systemic functioning to our daily lives of situated individuals as opposed 
to those defined by exogenously given utility functions. 
The result has been a blossoming of political economy across the social 
sciences and a sort of Cold War between it and mainstream economics, 
in which limited serious engagements take place other than in the unfulfilled 
demands of students for the Rethinking of Economics and its more pluralistic 
teaching. This is why the formation of Political Economy associations are 
so important in bringing together critiques of the mainstream, its putative 
interdisciplinarity, and its intolerance of alternatives. This has underpinned 
my own intellectual motivation in part for a number of decades, not least in 
how to sustain and to reproduce traditions and knowledges of alternatives, 
with critical knowledge of (and to be turned against) the increasingly intoler-
ant monopoly of the mainstream. 
Rhetorically speaking, where does this leave political economy and inter-
disciplinarity strategically, given the huge scope for analytical criticism? 
14 See Dymski (2015) although, unsurprisingly, diluted understandings of financialisation have 
begun to appear within mainstream literature.
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It is not, then, especially through “suspension”, to be underestimated 
how much the mainstream is capable of striking back by making minimal 
concessions through economics imperialism itself, as if such developments 
were capable of negating all criticisms from pluralist perspectives. There is 
thus the need for continuing to expose and critique the mainstream, even if 
doing so is arduous and unrewarding in certain respects. Also, as reflected 
in the movement for a pluralist economics, one must be mindful that there is 
considerable potential for both unity and division despite what might other-
wise appear to be a common purpose. Across almost all criteria, mainstream 
economics is methodologically, conceptually, theoretically, by its standard 
assumptions even, positioned at far extremes from the standard perspectives 
of other social sciences let alone political economy. Accordingly, there is 
so much to criticise from so many different standpoints that often the only 
thing critiques need to have in common is the multiplicity of (and not neces-
sarily shared) ways of disagreeing with the mainstream, whether minimally 
or as outright rejection. With the latest phase of economics imperialism as 
suspension, we are all pluralists now – although it is commonplace to find 
that mainstream economists accept pluralism in principle (or as a strategic 
response to what is perceived to be uninformed grumbles) whilst the practice 
is to reject alternatives as unscientific by some unspecified criterion (gener-
ally lack of mathematical modelling around TA2, suspended or otherwise).
In short, with suspension, we are all pluralists now although some are 
far more pluralist than others. To some degree, this situation plays into the 
hands of the latest phase of economics imperialism in a number of ways. 
First, it can selectively plunder heterodox economics in a marginal way, 
just as previously it has plundered social sciences, for variables to include 
in its (suspended) deployment of TA2. Second, this allows for what might 
be termed mainstream heterodoxy as a defence of the discipline – consider 
that we are responding to criticism, we are becoming more realistic, we are 
interacting with other social sciences. Third, this gives rise to claims that, 
far from perpetrating economics imperialism, economics is becoming more 
rounded, and even subject to, a reverse imperialism (as if the adoption of 
Indian cuisine in the United Kingdom, takeaways in particular, at the expense 
of fish and chips, is evidence of historical reversal of British imperialism). 
In this light, vigorous debate on whether the current nature of the main-
stream and its relationship with other social sciences is vital to situating 
and promoting alternatives. And there is such debate, on which consider-
able disagreements have arisen. An example of this is how Tony Lawson, 
the leading exponent of Critical Realism in Economics (CRE) has argued 
that neoclassical economics does not exist or, at the very least, is a misleading 
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term insofar as it does not have a common theoretical and conceptual core 
and certainly does not continue the traditions nor renew classical (political) 
economy. However, I would suggest that a trip to any number of lecture 
rooms, textbooks or journals, let alone economics departments, would 
indicate otherwise at least as far as core analytical content is concerned.15 
For Lawson, mainstream economics is defined by its deterministic, deduc-
tive methodology as opposed to substantive theory, and this is reflected in 
its increasing reliance upon mathematical modelling. A different if, to some 
degree, consistent interpretation is offered by Colander (2010) in which he 
sees neoclassical economics as disintegrating from outside, as new methods 
and factors are brought to bear, drawn for example from other social sci-
ences (i.e. reverse imperialism and more). As is apparent, I disagree with 
both of these interpretations and can explain why they might be termed a 
real illusion. In the case of mathematics (and econometrics) the discipline 
relies upon the false presumption that it is emulating some invented notion 
of the methods of the natural sciences. But, as I have sought to emphasise, 
alongside increasing mathematisation, there remains a core analytical content 
around TA2 even if suspended in the latest phase of economics imperialism. 
And the idea that this represents the disintegration of the mainstream from 
without is contradicted by the simple observation that, as the mainstream 
has expanded its scope and methods, it has become even more (and not less) 
tolerant of alternatives beyond what are very narrow boundaries. Indeed, 
put the issue of the disintegration of the mainstream before any heterodox 
economist seeking a job or student seeking a course of political economy 
or history of economic thought, economic methodology, etc. Instead, as I 
have argued, at the heart of mainstream economics lies TA2 even though it 
is now embedded in suspension, giving the appearance of no such thing as 
neoclassical economics (Lawson) and disintegration from outside (Colander).
Such different takes on the nature of the mainstream, and its interdis-
ciplinarity, have significant implications on how to situate opposition and 
alternatives. For Lawson, the main line of attack is through social ontol-
ogy where the mainstream is admittedly weak but not debilitatingly so. 
Tellingly, the mainstream has primarily and studiously ignored, even dis-
missed, methodological issues for decades. Whatever the intellectual merits 
of Lawson’s approach – and they are considerable – there must be doubts 
over its impact in persuading those within the mainstream to abandon it, 
and whether they might be better drawn to do so by questioning many of 
15 For my own critique and more general debate over Lawson’s stance, see Fine (2016b) and 
Morgan (2016), respectively.
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its extreme characteristics apart from those derived from its impoverished 
and ill -considered methodology. In short, CRE is just one amongst any 
number of avenues for critical assessment of the mainstream and for pos-
ing alternatives.16 And contra Colander, the idea that the mainstream will 
disintegrate from the outside through concerted but compliant contribution 
from heterodoxy is far -fetched.17
Nonetheless, my own inclination is unambiguously to lean towards 
being tolerant of all of the forms of heterodoxy, whilst engaging in vigor-
ous and critical debate over alternatives, mindful of the extent to which the 
monopoly of the discipline of economics by the mainstream renders any 
opposition extremely difficult, fragile and to be welcomed and nourished. 
Nonetheless, there is much to be said both for intellectual integrity – say-
ing how it is as opposed to what is acceptable to the mainstream – and 
never forgetting that pluralism is a stance of equal voice in very unequal 
circumstances, given the mainstream’s dominance.18 But in the realm of 
scholarship, at least in principle, it is the power of ideas and arguments 
that should prevail, and we have superior weapons across methodology, 
realism and interdisciplinarity especially as the mainstream exposes its 
weaknesses through economics imperialism. So, whilst we must be aware 
of the dangers of intellectual opportunism parading itself as strategic 
compromise, in the realm of ideas, intellectual integrity should take pride 
of place, alongside tolerance of its blooming wherever and however it can.
As a result, those engaged in heterodox, pluralist and/or interdisciplinary 
political economy should not underestimate the challenges they face from a 
hostile and dominant mainstream. But opportunities will open and close, pos-
sibly within economics itself (in response to student demands for example) as 
well as within other disciplines. In the United Kingdom for example, politi-
cal economy is strong within business and management schools for peculiar 
reasons: that it is interdisciplinary and successful (students think it gets them 
a job), that it corresponds to financial and hence intellectual independence 
16 Interestingly, Hodgson (2018) strongly supports the idea that TA2 remains paramount, at least 
through dependence upon utility maximisation if, ironically, he ignores the role of production 
functions. He puts this down to the inability to falsify the U max hypothesis empirically. He argues 
that reference to ethics and broader individual motivation may be the most effective strategy in 
displacing the mainstream. However, this overlooks the extent to which the mainstream remains 
committed to its core even where it can be falsified, not least the Cambridge Critique of Capital 
Theory in which he has himself somewhat previously made a telling contribution in pointing 
to neglect of its implications (Hodgson, 1997).
17 For a spirited critique of Colander, and especially that heterodoxy does not have anything to 
offer other than critique, see Lee (2013). 
18 Consider, for example, how many departments of economics would join an association of 
pluralist economics.
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and has some attachment to the real world (of business or otherwise), or that 
it represents an institutional strength of heterodoxy (Critical Management 
Studies), and a history of restructuring many disciplines under a single 
umbrella, at times under the leadership of radical academics from the 1960s 
as they attain institutional seniority. More generally, and more important, the 
turn against postmodernism (where it is not being reinvented) and towards 
the real in light of the privations of neoliberalism, and the stark realities 
of the GFC and its consequences, have meant that political economy has been 
centrally located in many disciplines and topics across the social sciences.
Different countries will have different disciplinary trajectories and contexts 
although the overall trend everywhere has been for the reduction and mar-
ginalisation of political economy even where it might previously have been 
both strong and vibrant. At an individual level, as opportunities equally open 
and close, compromises are needed with respect to publications and teach-
ing, and these should be tolerated whilst advocating for progress towards 
alternatives to the mainstream. Such developments are that much stronger 
and secure the more they are linked to, and supported by, associations of 
political economy, these in turn committed not only to the critique of the 
mainstream but also to interdisciplinarity. Having played a role in found-
ing the International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy – IIPPE 
(http://iippe.org/) a decade ago, and now serving as its Chair, I have been 
delighted that it has been able to engage with similar organisations, not least 
the Association française d’économie politique – AFEP (http://assoeconomie 
politique.org/), the Turkish Social Sciences Association – TSSA (http://
tsbd.org.tr/), and the Brazilian association Sociedade Brasileira de Economia 
Política – SEP (http://sep.org.br). IIPPE has held joint conferences with 
AFEP (another in 2019), and TSSA, and has longstanding relations with SEP. 
The same will apply to the newly -formed Rethinking Economics for 
Africa – REFA (http://www.rethinkeconomics.org/re-group/rethinking- 
economics-africa-wits/) which has just held its founding conference. IIPPE 
held its 2016 Conference in Lisbon and a future joint conference surely 
represents a promising step for promoting political economy both within 
and across national and disciplinary borders.
Edited by Scott M. Culp
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Economia e interdisciplinaridade: 
um passo em frente, n passos para 
trás?
A economia mainstream tornou -se mais 
interdisciplinar. Porquê? Representará 
isto uma rutura com seu carácter intra-
disciplinar? Como é que isso se relaciona 
com os aspetos mais criticados – a falta de 
realismo e o menosprezo por metodologia 
e escolas alternativas e a história do pen-
samento económico? Que luz é que isso 
lança sobre a natureza da economia hoje? 
As respostas encontram -se na identificação 
do “imperialismo económico” através de 
três fases, enfatizando a “lógica histórica” 
do imperialismo económico, e como o seu 
confinamento inicial à oferta e demanda do 
mercado criou um enquadramento lógico 
de aplicação universal. Como resultado, 
a microeconomia (e econometria) triun-
fou sobre outros campos e métodos, de 
tal forma e com tal aceitabilidade que 
princípios que lhe são correspondentes 
são hoje aplicados, ainda que de modo 
inconsistente, com os de outras disciplinas 
e campos, através de um processo denomi-
nado “suspensão”.
Palavras -chave: alternativas económicas; 
descolonização epistemológica; eco-
nomia mainstream; economia política; 
interdisciplinaridade.
Économie et Interdisciplinarité:  
un pas en avant, n pas en arrière?
L’économie mainstream est devenue inter-
disciplinaire. Pourquoi? Ceci représente-
-t -il une rupture avec son caractère 
intradisciplinaire? Comment cela est -il en 
rapport avec les points les plus critiqués 
– le manque de réalisme et le mépris envers 
la méthodologie et des écoles alternatives 
et l’histoire de la pensée économique? 
Quelle lumière cela lance -t -il sur la nature 
de l’économie aujourd’hui? Les réponses 
sont trouvées en identifiant l’“impérialisme 
économique” à travers de trois phases, 
en emphatisant la “logique historique” de 
l’impérialisme économique, avec son confi-
nement de base à l’offre et à la demande 
du marché qui créa un encadrement 
logique à l’application universelle. Comme 
résultat, la microéconomie (et l’économé-
trie) triompha sur d’autres domaines et 
méthodes, de telle forme et avec une telle 
acceptabilité, que ses principes correspon-
dants sont à présent appliqués, bien que 
de façon inconsistante, avec ceux d’autres 
disciplines et domaines par le biais d’un 
procédé dénommé “suspension”.
Mots -clés: alternatives économiques; 
économie mainstream; décolonisation 
épistémologique; économie politique; 
interdisciplinarité.
